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Shealey: Shealey: Applying ADR to Hospital Staff Privilege Disputes:

COMMENT
APPLYING ADR TO HOSPITAL STAFF
PRIVILEGE DISPUTES: A
PRESCRIPTION FOR THE FUTURE OF
HEALTH CARE?
I. INTRODUCTION

In today's world of rising medical costs, hospital liability for staff negligence, and the uncertainty surrounding the viability of many medical
procedures, hospitals are increasingly concerned with having competent
doctors who can work effectively in a changing medical environment. In
order to regulate staff quality, hospitals have broad discretion in granting,
terminating, and reducing hospital staff privileges t
Most physicians and other health professionals must be granted
privileges in order to practice their profession because "privileges allow
physicians the right to admit and discharge their patients to and from the
hospital as well as the right to use hospital facilities." 2 As one commentator
noted, "hospitals are to most physicians as courtrooms are to trial attorneys:
access is essential to a thriving practice, second only, perhaps, to licensure
by the state."3 Due to the lack of a constitutional right allowing doctors to
practice medicine in a hospital,4 physicians must apply to hospitals for access
which will allow them to use the modern technologies and facilities that
could not be obtained on an individual basis. 5 Once staff privileges are
granted, a physician will be awarded "clinical privileges" which will allow the
physician to perform certain procedures according to his medical ability and
training.6 As the costs of medical procedures and medical equipment

1. Arkin, Impartiality in Medical Staff Privileges Cases, 51 CONN. MED. 235, 235 (1987).
2. Classen, Tying Staff Privileges to Physician Employment Contracts: An Erosion of Due
Process or a Necessary Evil?, 18 SETON HALL L REv. 4, 7 (1988).
3. Hein, Hospital Staff Privileges and the Courts: Practice and Prognosis, 34 FED'N INS.
COUNS. Q. 157, 157 (1984).
4. Kling v. Lutheran Charities Ass'n., 523 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir. 1975) (citing Hayman v.
Galveston, 273 U.S. 414, (1927)).
5. Classen, supra note 2, at 7.
6. Id. (citing Joint Commission On Accreditation Of Hospitals, Accreditation Manual for
Hospitals 109 n. 9 (1987)).
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increase, the importance of obtaining hospital staff privileges also increases.7
The lack of a constitutional basis on which doctors can argue a right to
practice medicine, as well as traditional judicial deference to privilege cases,
allows hospitals to use broad discretion in deciding which applicants will be
able to use their facilities. 8 However, the denial or termination of a
physician's privileges can have a negative impact on that person's future
practice of medicine.' The general judicial acceptance of hospital discretion
has created a tremendous number of cases disputing the procedures
employed in granting or terminating privileges:
This tension between the increased demand for staff privileges on
the one hand and the restraint in granting privileges on the other
has led to frequent controversy between the physician denied of
privileges and the hospital making that determination. . . . That
physicians have begun to insist on their procedural due process
rights by a group of citizens who were, until recently, not highly
concerned with the legal aspects of the practice of their profession.10
Although hospital policies to restrict privileges serve an essential public
purpose in that it encourages review of physicians that cannot be achieved
by individual patients," the court congestion created by these policies is
probably not justified. Hospitals should be encouraged to incorporate bylaw
provisions which provide for extensive internal resolution procedures before
a case is taken to court.
Partly as a result of the number of cases filed, and also the concern that
physicians whose privileges were revoked or denied could establish privileges
at another hospital with an untainted record, Congress enacted the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) of 1986.
The HCQIA is
"designed to encourage physicians to identify and discipline other physicians
who are incompetent or who engage in unprofessional conduct."13 The Act
provides for mandatory reporting by hospitals and other health care entities
to a national data base of their professional review actions which adversely

7. Classen, supra note 2, at 7.
8. Sosa v. Board of Managers, 437 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1971).
9. Cray, Due Process Considerationsin Hospital Staff Privileges Cases, 7 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 217, 217 (1979).
10. Id. at 217-218.
11. Id. at 217.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1986).
13. H.R. 5540, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. VoL. 132 No. 141 PART II 9954,
9957 (Oct. 14, 1986).
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affect a physician's privileges for more than 30 days.14 Before granting
privileges, a hospital must contact the designated agency of the national
data base to determine the applicant's status as to malpractice claims,
Subsequent to granting
lawsuits, and former privilege revocations.15
privileges to an applicant, the hospital must inquire with the agency every
16
two years as to any changes in the physician's status. Adequate notice and
a hearing must also be given to a physician being brought before the
professional review board. 17 The Act also provides immunity from antitrust
and other actions for persons who participated reasonably in the review
process. 8 The Act does not, however, force hospitals to grant staff
privileges. 9 This Comment will examine portions of the HCQIA, cases
arising out of privilege disputes, and the role of dispute resolution both
within and beyond the confines of the HCQIA.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW

A. Common Cases
Most cases involving privilege conflicts are submitted on an antitrust
theory; however, malicious interference with the right to practice a chosen
profession, failure to provide due process, and defamation have also been
grounds for action. 20 Antitrust cases often arise out of hospital contracts
which require certain procedures to be performed exclusively by members
of an outside firm.Zl The Supreme Court addressed the antitrust issue in
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde.72 The case involved a
physician suing a hospital for denying him the ability to perform anesthesiological services at the hospital. 23 The hospital had an exclusive contract
with an outside anesthesiology firm of which the applying doctor was not
a member. 24 The Supreme Court held that the hospital did not violate the

14. 42 U.S.C. § 11133 (1986).
15. Id at § 11135(a)(1).
16. Id. at § 11135(a)(2).
17. Id. at § 11112.
18. Id at § 11111.
19. Id at § 11115(b).

20. P. KRAus, HEALTH

CARE RISK MANAGEMENT-ORGANIZATION AND CLAIMS ADMINISTRA-

TION 13 (1986).

21.
22.
23.
24.

Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1983).
466 U.S. 2 (1983).
Id.
Id.
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Sherman Act' as the plaintiff failed to show that he could not practice
anesthesiology at several other hospitals in the community.' As Justice
O'Connor stated in her concurring opinion:
In determining whether an exclusive dealing contract is unreasonable, the proper focus is on the structure of the market for the
products or services in question the number of buyers or sellers in
the market, the volume of their business, and the ease with which
buyers and sellers can redirect their purchases and sales to othm
Exclusive dealing is an unreasonable restraint on trade only when
a significant fraction of buyers or sellers are frozen out of the
market by the exclusive deal."

Although the Hyde case may seem to indicate that hospitals will
generally be successful in antitrust actions, that is not the point. The issue
is whether the number of cases being submitted on antitrust grounds is
warranted. The legislature, in enacting the HCQIA, apparently did not
think so since it provides antitrust immunity for members of peer review
committees
who act reasonably and in compliance with the provisions of the
.8
Act
The issue of malicious interference to practice a chosen profession was
presented in the 1965 Missouri case of Cowan v. Gibson.' In Cowan,
hospital staff members conspired to prevent Dr. Cowan from acquiring staff
privileges in their hospital.' The court held that the conspiracy violated
plaintiffs contractual rights with his patients since it was found that hospital
staff membership was necessary to treat patients in the county in which
Cowan wanted to practice.3

When tensions arise between hospitals and physicians, grounds for a
defamation action may also arise. In a Florida case,32 a disagreement arose
between two physicians who were practicing as partners. Subsequently, one
of the partners made statements at a staff meeting regarding the other
partner's inability to effectively carry out his practice. 3 Based on these

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
Hyde, 466 U.S. at 30.
Id at 45 (citing Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949)).
42 U.S.C. §11111 (1986).
Cowan v. Gibson, 392 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1965).
Id. at 308.
Id. at 310.

32. Zambrano v. Devanesan, 484 So. 2d 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
33. Id. at 605.
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statements, the disgruntled partner made a motion to withdraw the other
partner's privileges, 3' the other partner not being present at the meeting.3 5
By a vote of the staff members at the meeting, the other partner's privileges
were revoked.' The court found the comments made at the meeting to be
libelous. 37 Based on precedent of various defamation cases, the court
concluded that the statements contained factual allegations; they were not
preceded by any factual background regarding the relationship between the
two partners; and there was no reason to believe that the persons present
at the staff meeting were aware of the partners' hostility.M
B. Due Process and the Public-PrivateDistinction
There have also been numerous cases alleging that a hospital failed to
provide due process in granting or denying staff privileges.39 The question
of due process (i.e., adequate notice, hearing, and reasonable justification for
denial or termination) has historical importance because of the privatepublic hospital controversy.' However, the HCQIA may alleviate some of
these disputes since it applies to virtually all hospitals.4 1 Excluded from the
Act is "a professional society (or committee thereof) if, within the previous
5 years, the society has been found by the Federal Trade Commission or
any court to have engaged in any anticompetitive practice which had the
effect of restricting the practice of licensed health care practitioners."42 The
legislative history of the Act is silent as to why Congress rejected the
traditional public-private disparity, but the subsequent discussion of the
recent dilution of this disparity may provide part of the answer.
Under the public-private distinction, public hospitals are subject to the
fourteenth amendment, thus subjecting staff privilege decisions of hospital
governing boards to judicial review.43 Decisions of private hospitals,
however, have not traditionally been found to have a constitutional or
statutory basis for court intervention, thus leaving physicians without a

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 607.
Id.
Arkin, supra note 1, at 235.
40. Hein, supra note 3, at 159.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(4)(a).
42. Id. § 11151(4)(B).
43. Hein, supra note 3, at 159.
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judicial remedy if their privileges are adversely affected.' "In its purest
form, the doctrine provides private hospital governing boards complete
discretion in choosing its medical staff, regardless of the applicant's
qualifications or the hospital's refusal to give reasons for its rejection. "45
The principle of judicial exclusion is based on the fundamental right of a
private corporation to manage its own internal affairs.'
The public-private antithesis has been criticized because it is said that
the effect on a physician of an adverse result is the same in either setting."
However, there has been some shift in case law which now requires private
hospitals to provide due process to physicians in jeopardy of losing their
privileges.' Although physicians have no unqualified constitutional right
to practice medicine in a facility of their choosing, 49 California has adopted
a common law approach treating staff privileges as membership in an
association: 0
it is the power that the association [hospital] is able to exert over
the economic necessities of the individual applicant that mandates
minimal protections accompanying the association's decision" . . .
Once admitted, the individual cannot be ousted without protection
even though membership may be subject to
of a fair procedure
52
periodic review.
California does not necessarily advocate a complete trial; only that "an
affected individual must at least be provided with some meaningful
are
opportunity to respond to the 'charges' against him."53 Physicians
the
fourteenth
though
that
even
by
the
fact
protection
guaranteed additional
amendment does not apply to private hospitals, these hospitals are
"precluded from acting arbitrarily, capriciously, discriminatorily, or unreason-

44. Wood v. Hilton Head Hosp., 292 S.C. 403, 356 N.E.2d 841 (S.C. 1987).
45. Hein, supra note 3, at 160.
46. Kraus, supra note 20, at 131.
47. Note, Medical Staff Membership Decisions:JudicialIntervention, 19 U. ILL. L. REv. 473,
485 (1985).
48. Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 NJ. 389, 192 A.2d 81 (1963).
49. Hayman v. Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1987).
50. Ascherman v. San Fransisco Medical Socy, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681
(1974).
51. Cray, supra note 9, at 249.
52. Id. at 244.
53. Pinkster v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists, 526 P.2d 253, 256, 116 Cal. Rptr.
245 (Cal. 1974).
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ably."54 In Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center,55 the hospital denied the
plaintiffs application for privileges based on a bylaw provision which
allowed denial if the applicant was found to have an inability to work with
others.5 6 Although the court said that a physician's ability to work with
other hospital personnel may effect the quality of care, there was a danger
that such a rule could be considered arbitrary and capricious." Thus, the
court held that in cases of rejection based on the "inability to work with
others",5" the hospital must show:
[t]hat an applicant's inability to 'work with others'in the hospital
setting is such as to present a real and substantial danger that
patients treated by him might receive other than a 'high quality of
medical care' at the facility if he were admitted to membership. 59
In attempting to comply with the arbitrary and capricious standards,
however, all hospitals should be careful not to grant privileges to a
physician known to be incompetent.' ° Granting privileges to this type of
person could subject the hospital to liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior arising out of a negligence action.6 '
It is likely that hospitals will struggle with the HCQIA's provisions for
providing due process because often members of their professional review
committees are staff colleagues who have already learned about potential
conflicts. 62 The Act's provisions require adequate notice and hearing to the
physician under review or "such other procedures as are fair to the physician
under the circumstances."' The Act also states that some hearings cannot
be held before individuals who are in direct economic competition with the

54. McCall, A Hospital's Liability for Denying Suspending or Granting Staff Privileges, 32
BAYLOR L. REV. 175, 213 (1980).
55. 614 P.2d 258, 166 Cal. Rptr. 826 (Cal. 1980).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 266, 166 Cal.
Id at 265, 166 Cal.
Id at 266, 166 Cal.
Id at 267, 166 Cal.
McCall, supra note

Rptr.
Rptr.
Rptr.
Rptr.
54, at

at 826.
at 834-835.
at 835.
at 837-838.
212.

61. Id. at 212, 213.
62. Cray, supra note 9, at 255.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (1986). The standards stated in the text of the comment are for
illustrative purposes only. See the specific provisions in this section as to the other
requirements that hospitals must comply with in taking peer review action.
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physician;' indeed, physicians are justified in their expectations of being
afforded due process:
By contracting with a physician, a hospital attempts to capitalize on
a physician's stature in the community and profit from his talents.
A hospital should not be allowed to act in a. parasitic manner and
totally abandon the physician for another more profitable relationship.6
Admittedly, hospitals could cure many problems by specifically providing
for due process in their bylaws," but this remedy "may not provide the
physician with his ultimate goal: staff membership at a particular hospital."67
The main reason that due process does not ensure that a physician will be
granted privileges is because hospitals can use criteria other than a
physician's demeanor and background in determining whether privileges
should be granted.68 Factors such as the economy, lack of technological
equipment, and the cost of medical procedures may be employed in
determining the need for a particular physician.'
It is not necessarily
improper to employ these other factors in reaching a decision, but
physicians must know the reasons behind a denial of privileges. Due
process does not require that the reason behind a decision be spelled out;
only that a physician is afforded an opportunity to be heard. 70 As will be
discussed later, mediation may be a good way for physicians to gain
knowledge of all the factors involved in a privileges decision.
C. Judicial Deference

Additional suppression of physician satisfaction has come about as a
result of the unwillingness of courts to review hospital staff privilege

64. Id. at § 11112(b)(3).

See this provision as to the specific application of economic

interests.
65. Classen, supra note 2, at 25.
66.
67.
Loy. U.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 10.
Nodzenski, Medical Staff Decisions in Private Hospitals: The Role of Due Process, 18
CH L.J. 951, 988 (1987).
Id.
Classen, supra note 2, at 7.
Nodzenski, supra note 67, at 988.
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decisions. One of the most famous cases in this regard is Sosa v. Board
of Managers of Val Verde Memorial Hospital"7 in which the court stated:
Human lives are at stake and the governing board must be given
discretion in its selection so that it can have confidence in the
competence and moral commitment of its staff. The evaluation of
professional proficiency of doctors is best left to the specialized
expertise in their peers, subject only to limited judicial surveillance.
The court is charged with the narrow responsibility of assuring that
the qualifications imposed by the board are reasonably related to
the hospital and fairly administered. In short, so long as staff
selections are administered with fairness, geared by a rationale
compatible with hospital responsibility and unencumbered with
irrelevant considerations, a court should not interfere. 73
The hospital involved in the Sosa case was a public one, and thus clearly
required to comply with the fourteenth amendment due process provisions.'
Although it has been suggested that judicial deference should remain
the same whether the decision involves denying initial privileges or
terminating existing ones, 7 there is authority to suggest that termination
carries more ill effects than denial.76 The additional problems involved in
termination are evident because a disgruntled staff physician has the
potential of jeopardizing patient care and interfering with sufficient hospital
administration. 77 These problems, however, have not been found to be so
significant as to justify the application of a higher judicial review standard
in termination cases.' One court was persuaded in their decision to defer
to the hospital board because of the fact that most hospitals have peer
review committees, and most hospitals are regulated through state and
federal laws. 9 Due to the unique "crisis atmosphere"' created in a hospital
71. Maimon v. Sisters of the Third Order, 20 I1. App. 3d 1090, 76 Ill.Dec. 517, 458
N.E.2d 1317 (1983); Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1971) (denial of staff
privileges based on bylaw provisions would only be set aside if basis was arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable).
72. 437 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1971).
73. Id. at 177.
74. Id. at 176.
75. Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital, 526 A.2d 697, 702 (N.J. 1987).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 703.
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from the number of people and the types of injuries that need to be
handled, judicial review is often limited to "whether procedures employed
are fair, standards set by the hospital are fair, and standards are applied
with arbitrariness or capriciousness."'"
Many courts have placed particular emphasis on their own lack of
medical expertise in justifying their refusal to review privilege decisions,'
while other courts have employed the substantial evidence test as a
justification for judicial deference.8u Under the substantial evidence test, a
court will uphold a peer review committee's decision unless the decision
lacks a reasonable evidentiary basis; i.e., "unless administrative findings
'viewed in light of the entire record, [are] so lacking in evidentiary support
as to render [them] unreasonable... .'"8 In Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans
Hospital,u the court focused on the unique relationships found in hospitals.8
The Stretten court noted the importance of compatibility among all staff
members because of the reliance that physicians must place upon other
medical personnel in treating a patient. Due to the "constant exercise of
professional judgment "8 which could only be known by those working in the
medical field, it is unlikely that courts will supplant their own decision for
that made by the medical staff. 8
III. VIABILITY OF MEDIATION
A. Overview
Given limited judicial intervention, the arguments for allowing due
process, and the importance of preserving hospital relationships, mediation
may be an appropriate way to incorporate these three factors into a
cohesive method for resolving many hospital staff privilege disputes.
Mediation is a process whereby the disputing parties use a neutral person(s)

81. Id. (citing Miller v. Indiana Hospital, 277 Pa. Super. 370, 375, 419 A.2d 1191, 1194
(1980)).
82. Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839, 846 (5th Cir. 1971); Laje v. R.E. Thomasen
Gen. Hosp., 564 F.2d 1159 (1977).
83. Laje, 564 F.2d at 1162; Northern Inyo Hosp. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n.,
38 Cal. App. 3d 14, 112 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1974); Cipriotti v. Board of Directors, 147 Cal. App.
3d 144, 196 Cal. Rptr. 367 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
84. Cipriotti, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 84, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 372 (citing Northern Inyo, 38 Cal.
App. 3d 14, 24, 112 Cal. Rptr. 872).
85. 537 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1976).
86. Id. at 368.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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to develop options and formulate alternatives in resolving particular issues.'
The mediator lacks authority to render a judgment, 9° but he fulfills
important functions in helping parties to objectively perceive the ramifications of their actions and the need for a solution.9 1 The following
discussion will focus on the role of mediation when there is an issue of
terminating existing staff privileges. The problems and limitations in
employing mediation in initial applications for privileges will be discussed
in a subsequent section.
As hospitals become more cost-conscious, the use of some method for
improving employer-staff relations may be crucial in helping doctors and
hospitals understand each others' needs and concerns. 92 Physicians are often
said to have a "God-like" status" which causes them to isolate their
concerns and fail to seek help in a particular situation. Most doctors have
been taught that the patient is their ultimate priority, thus making it
difficult for them to work within the current constraints placed on the type
and amount of care that can be rendered.' Joseph Califano said, "Medicine's high priests, the doctors, have said once too often, and with an
arrogance we no longer accept, that only they should know what to
prescribe, where to treat us, and how they should be paid."" In addition,
doctors are faced with the uncertainty posed by medical technology which

89.

J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION, A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING

CONFLICTS WTHOUT LmGATION 10 (1984).
90. L. RISKIN & . WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAwYERs 196 (1987).
91. Id. at 210.
92. Arkin, supra note 2, at 235-36.
93. Editorial, The Oasis Syndrome: The Physician's Need for Refuge, Am. FAM. PHYSIC. 121,
121 (Oct. 1983).
94. Perhaps the best example of this is the use of Diagnostically-Related Groups (DRG)
developed by Medicare. DRGs classify diseases and illnesses and places a constraint on the
dollar amount allocated for treating that particular disease or illness in its acute phase. 42
C.F.R. 405 (1986).
95.

J.

CAuFANO, AMERIcA'S HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION-WHo LivEs? WHO DIES? WHO

PAYS? 5 (1986).
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is capable of both alleviating illnesses and extending the lives of terminally
ill or comatose patients. 96 As one commentator noted:
It is no wonder many practitioners react to the law and lawyers
angrily. Obviously they are puzzled, frustrated and frightened.
Everything has changed; they seem to have lost control of what used
to be their sacred and familiar territory. In a very short span of
years, the legal system has moved from a posture of benign
indifference about health matters, to an attitude of active intervention in all aspects of health care delivery.'
Hospitals are also facing increased legal exposure by being held liable
for the negligent acts of their staff," thus reinforcing the need for discretion
in making privilege decisions. 99 In addition, there are many problems
arising out of the cost constraints imposed by Medicaid, Medicare, and
third-party payers) °°
The tensions between hospitals and physicians, as well as the tensions
created by legal considerations, are likely to increase as society tries to deal
with the ethical, economic, legal, and emotional concerns created by today's
health care industry.' The person most likely to be hurt by these increased
tensions, however, is the patient, who has no voice in staff privilege
decisions."' This is not to say that patient feelings go unnoticed since they
are not directly involved in decisions regarding staff privileges. The patient
suffers because many doctors are working in an environment where they feel
unable to express their concerns and fears to the administration. 3 In order
to alleviate some current concerns amongst administrators and physicians
and provide the best possible environment for their patients, these parties

96. Springer & Casale, Hospitals and the Disruptive Health Care Practitioner- Is the Inability
to Work With Others Enough to Warrant Exclusion?, 24 Duo. L. REv. 377, 379 (1985).
97. Id. at 379, fn. 6.
98. Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Alaska 1987). (Where there is an existing
employment relationship, the doctrine of respondeat superior can be invoked to hold a hospital
liable for the physician's negligent acts); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163
N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
99. Roberts, Radany, & Nash, PrivilegeDelineation in a Demanding New Environment, 108
ANNALS INTERN. MED. 880, 880 (1988).
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (1983); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-18(b) (West 1983).
101. Classen, supra note 2, at 26.

102. Id.
103. Id.
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need to have direct contact with each other, and mediation may be the
appropriate mechanism for such contact."°
B. Communicationaland Educational Benefits
In providing an appropriate forum for due process, the HCQIA
recommends three alternative bodies before whom a hearing may be held,'O
none of which include mediation. The legislative history of the Act lacks
evidence as to why the drafters failed to incorporate a mediation alternative,
but mediation may compliment the HCQIA provisions providing for due
process.' 6
The Act provides for three alternative bodies to carry out the notice
and hearing requirements.10 7 Arbitration is expressly provided for, which,
along with mediation, has been hailed as a useful tool in alternative dispute
resolution.'0 However, arbitration incorporates more of the aspects of court
adjudication than does mediation.' Arbitration is "a voluntary process in
which people in conflict request the assistance of a partial and neutral third
party ....

f,0 The third-party arbitrator, however, renders a final decision

which may be either advisory or binding.'
In mediation, the mediator's
role is to reconcile two parties' interests rather than determine which party
is right.12 Due to the traditional powerfulness of both hospitals and
physicians,"' as well as their concern about due process provisions,14 leaving
the ultimate decision-making authority in the hands of mediators may be in
everyone's best interest.

104. J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 89, at 9.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(3)(A), including an arbitrator, a hearing officer appointed by the
hospital who is not in direct economic competition with the hospital in question, or a panel of
persons appointed by the hospital who also are not directly in financial competition with the
physician in question.
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a).
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 11112(b)(3).
108. GOLDBERG, GREEN & SANDER, DiSPUTE RESOLUTION 191 (1986). {Need first initials

if this is a book)
109. Id. at 189.
110.

C. MOORE, THE MEDIATION

PROCESS-PRACTICAL

STRATEGIES

FOR RESOLVING

CONFLICT 7 (Jossey-Bass 1986).

111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 17.
J. CALIFANO, supra note 95, at 5.
Cray, supra note 9, at 217.
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Futhermore, arbitration does not promote the same type of open
communication that may be the key to reducing the number of staff
privilege cases:
[Regarding the use of mediation] The reduction of hostility - by
encouraging direct communication - between the participants
through the process of mediation - facilitates the permanence of a
settlement. It naturally reduces the likelihood that a legal battle
will continue beyond the mediation process. Mediation tends to
diffuse hostilities by promoting cooperation through a structured
process. In contrast, litigation tends to focus hostilities and harden
the disputants' anger into rigidly polarized positions.115
Although arbitration also encourages more direct party communication than
could be obtained in the traditional adjudicative setting, it has been held
that "adjudication and arbitration are the most rigid and least satisfactory
methods of conflict resolution for participants.""6 This is because the
wishes of the two parties are "mutually exclusive" and only one of those
wishes can be chosen in reaching a final decision." 7
Mediation is not necessarily intended to resolve the underlying
psychological problems that accompany many disputes," 8 but the normally
short time involved in reaching a solution will certainly alleviate the anxiety
that can manifest itself when parties are without a solution for a long
period of time." 9 The need for expediency is particularly important in a
hospital setting. Tension is often created by continually making life and
death decisions.120 It may be too much to demand that a physician worry
about whether his privileges are in jeopardy because he may have acted
inappropriately in a certain situation.'2'
A potential benefit of mediation is that it fosters the role of a physician
as a decision-maker because the physician will be directly involved in the
process of resolution. Although physicians engaged in peer review probably
do not classify themselves as mediators, it would not be difficult to envision
a situation where peer review committees could accomplish the same goals

115. J. FOLBERG & A- TAYLOR, supra note 89, at 10.
116. Id. at 26.
117. Id.
118.
119.
120.
121.
541, 542

Id. at 8.
Id.
Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital, 526 A.2d 697, 703 (NJ. 1987).
Chenen, Hospital Privileges: Speak Softly, But Carry A Big Lawyer, 50 CONN. MED.
(1986).
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of mediation. Given the fact that many of the physicians on review
committees work in the same hospital as the physician whose standards are
being questioned, 12 it is important that reviews be conducted in a fair and
open manner. Since suspension rather than termination of privileges could
be the end result, physicians need to feel that they will be respected when
their privileges are reinstated.' 3 To many physicians, peer review, exemplifies their professionalism and their selflessness and devotion to patient care.
Believing that they have a collective responsibility as a profession to
maintain the quality and contain the cost of medical care, physicians are
understandably resentful when their efforts in these decisions are challenged
by the court. 124
Although some might revel in the thought of taking power out of the
hands of physicians, doctors currently face enough problems in understanding their roles as healers in society1* without also being deprived of voicing
their concerns in an action against them.'2 As one author said:
The ultimate authority in mediation belongs to the participants
themselves, and they may fashion a solution that will work for them
without being strictly governed by precedent or being unduly
concerned with the precedent they may set for others ....Unlike

the adjudicatory process, the emphasis is not on who is right or
a workable solution that meets the
wrong, but rather on establishing
1 27
participants' unique needs.
The idea of reaching a workable solution is inordinately appealing to
the physician whose privileges are in question because he allegedly made a
wrong diagnosis or failed to render the appropriate treatment. Mediation
could promote communication is these matters which is particularly
important since many aspects of medical care are still without a scientific

122. Arkin, supra note 1, at 235.
123. Id. at 237.
124. Havighurst, ProfessionalPeer Review and the Antitust Laws, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
1117, 1117 (1985-86).
125. H. BURSTAJN, R. HAMM, R. FEINBLOOM & A. BRODSKY, MEDICAL CHOICES, MEDICAL
CHANGES-How PATIENTS, FAMIuEs AND PHYSICIANS CAN COPE WITH UNCERTAINTY 64 (1981).

Doctors are increasingly concerned with whether a particular treatment must be rendered, and
yet failure to administer treatment may result in a suit for malpractice. It has been said that
consumers' expectations of certainty are fostering the current conflict.
126. J.CALIFANO, supra note 95, at 5.
127.

J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 89, at 10.
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solution."z Although it is troublesome to admit that some patients are
without an absolute cure, failure to recognize the uncertainty surrounding
medical treatment could result in the wrongful termination of a physician's
privileges.
Indeed, many hospitals may exclude seemingly qualified
physicians from practice by evaluating a physician's competency based on the
number of patients that he cures.129 It may seem morally repugnant to
reduce healthcare to monetary terms. However, given the current concern
over cost-containment, increased physician understanding about the medical
crisis can only enhance the relationship between administrators and
physicians, and foster doctors' acceptance of privilege decisions."3
C. The Role of Mediation in Reducing Litigation

Mediation also provides mechanisms for dealing with the problems that
often arise in staff privilege disputes. These problems include the concern
of being afforded due process, and the motivation behind the contention
that a physician acted in a manner that could result in termination of his
privileges."' It has been suggested that the medical care cost crisis may
motivate hospitals to terminate physicians who are perceived as problematic
with "physicians who generate a level of income
in order to replace them
1 32
it deems 'acceptable."
Although the economic problems cannot be undermined or avoided, a
mediator is said to act "as an agent of reality to help the parties probe
whether their positions are realistic and what practical effects flow from
their choice of outcomes."133 This makes it likely that a mediator could
pinpoint situations where a hospital brings an action for termination solely
on the basis of perceived economic necessity.
Cases are lacking on whether economics could be classified as an
arbitrary or capricious standard in determining a physician's access to
hospital facilities, 134 but doctors should be made aware of the reasons behind
the denial or termination of their privileges. 135 Admittedly, informing

128.

L. MCCULLOUGH & J. MORRIS, IMPLICATIONS OF HISTORY AND ETHics To MEDICINE-

VETERINARY AND HUMAN 26 (1978).
129. Classen, supra note 2 at 26.
130. Caplan, Can We Talk? A Review of Jay Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient,
9 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 43, 49 (1987).
131. Arkin, supra note 1, at 235.
132. Classen, supra note 2, at 26.
133. J.FoLBERG & A TAYLOR, supra note 89, at 247.
134. Classen, supra note 2, at 26.
135. Id. at 26.
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physicians of the specific reasons behind rejection of privileges is more in
the interest of preserving physician integrity than adhering to hospital
bylaws. 36 However, given the fact that privileges "reflect peer approval and
a physician's status in the medical community,"13 respecting physician
integrity may be an important factor in improving doctors' attitudes toward
hospitals and administration.
Even if economics is part of the reason for reducing a physician's
privileges, the physician should be made aware of this as physicians need to
work within the confines created by outside forces."a Physicians are often
so overwhelmed with keeping abreast of the literature on medical advances
that they fail to realize that technical knowledge may be superfluous if a
hospital does not have the resources to provide for certain procedures. 39
Since mediation does not require that a final decision be reached, mediation
provides a mechanism for reevaluation of a solution if circumstances
change." ° Mediation affords parties the opportunity to become educated
about changes in the system to the extent that they could not inform
themselves from reading a textbook or journal.' t
Due process questions can also be resolved through the use of
mediation. Since physicians will be allowed a direct opportunity to present
their problems and questions, there is little room to later argue that they
were not afforded a full and fair opportunity to be heard. 42 Admittedly,
problems may arise if the mediator is a colleague, so hospitals must
carefully consider the appointment of a mediator(s).,43 There are cases that
hold that a person, panel or agency does not necessarily violate due process
by performing,
both an investigative and an adjudicative function, and that
administrative fact finders are not necessarily disqualified from
participating in an adversary proceeding simply because they have

136. Caplan, supra note 130, at 49.
137. Classen, supra note 2, at 8.
138. Roberts, Radanay & Nash, supra note 99, at 880.
139. Id. at 882.
140. J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 89, at 10.
141. Id.
142. Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Haw. 475, 497 P.2d 564 (1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1048 (1972).
143. Klinge, 527 F.2d at 58. Absent a showing of personal hostility toward a physician,
a physician's peers are not prevented from determining a physician's competency in regards to
his future employment with a hospital.
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been exposed to evidence presented in non-adversary investigative
procedures that were followed prior to the adversary hearing.'"
Although a staff physician may possess the expertise that courts have cited
as a basis for judicial deference, mediation must not err on the side of
partiality or bias. 45 Courts recognize a presumption of impartiality in
privilege cases,' 46 so the physician has the burden of proving that there was
bias.1 47 Hospitals should not take advantage of this presumption, however,
because a failure to provide impartiality may violate due process as well as
the concept of self-regulation.'"
At least one medical center, Stanford University, has employed an
49
outside person to act as an ombudsman for resolving particular disputes.
The ombudsman is also responsible for monitoring the institution's
The
interpersonal relationships in order to provide for preventive action.'
first medical center ombudsman was an emeritus professor of medicine. 5'
An ombudsman is not the equivalent of a mediator, but Stanford's success
in the employment of an ombudsman provides some precedent for the
theory that
mediation may be a worthwhile alternative for hospitals to
152
employ.
Although the ombudsman concept is not well developed in this
country, 153 Stanford has found their ombudsman beneficial, especially in
cases of possible termination of a physician's privileges. 5 4 Stanford's
ombudsman will review the employee's work record to determine whether
it ever contained allegations of inadequate performance. 5 5 The ombudsman
will then make a report of his findings to the supervisor. The program has
also provided the opportunity for employees to voice their concerns over

144. Id. at 63 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975)).
145. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 35.
146. Kiracofe v. Reid Memorial Hosp., 461 N.E.2d 1134, 1140-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
147. Ritter v. Board of Comm'rs., 637 P.2d. 940, 946 (Wash. 1981).
148. Arkin, supra note 1, at 235.
149. Waxman, A NonlitigationalApproach to Conflict Resolution: The Medical Center as A
Model, 42 ARB. J. 25, 28 (1987).
150. Id. at 28.
151. Waxman, Vosti & Barbour, Role of the Ombudsman in the Modem Medical Center,
144 WJ. MED. 627, 628 (1986).
152. Id. at 629-630.
153. Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adversary System, 75 COLUM. L. REv.
845, 847 (1975).
154. Waxman, supra note 149, at 30.
155. Id.
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non-work related stress, like domestic and financial difficulties."t This has
resulted in employee counseling and remedial programs, and "in some cases
in improved employee performance, thus benefitting both the supervisor and
employee." 57
Stanford's success in resolving many disputes without litigation may be
attributable to the fact that the ombudsman's office is separated from the
medical facility itself, but is still readily accessible.m Although the person
initially employed had medical training, an article on Stanford's program did
note that not all university ombudsman have been psychiatrists or physicians."5 9 The initial cost of employing a mediator may not seem beneficial,
but long-term employment of this type of person may reduce
60 the number
of bias allegations currently alleged in staff privilege cases.'
D. Mediation's Limitations in Privilege Disputes
There are problems with devising a system for mediation of denial of
staff privileges rather than termination of existing privileges. This is
because the concerns with preserving a doctor's relationship with his
patients and colleagues are not present as the physician is not yet part of
the health care institution. Furthermore, most suits against hospitals for
denial of privileges are brought on an antitrust theory, and antitrust actions
are not accorded the same judicial deference found in most hospital staff
privilege cases. 161 In American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire &
Co.,162 the court denied a request to stay litigation despite a valid arbitration
agreement, stating:
A claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter.
The Sherman Act is designed to promote the national interest in
a competitive economy; thus the plaintiff asserting his rights under
the Act has been likened to a private attorney general who protects
Antitrust violations can affect hundreds of
the public interest ....
thousands - perhaps millions - of people and inflict staggering

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Waxman, Vosti & Barbour, supra note 151, at 628.
159. Id.
160. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), Although the Supreme Court has stated that
a person's peers are not automatically disqualified from making a determination of that person's
competency, an issue of bias is frequently asserted where such peers are employed.
161. American Safety & Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968)
(holding that an antitrust suit was properly brought despite the parties' agreement to arbitrate).
162. Id.
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[The issues in antitrust cases are prone to
be complicated, and the evidence extensive and diverse, far better
suited to judicial than to arbitration procedures."
economic damage....

The public interest concern is indeed warranted, but it is likely that
some physicians and administrators will avoid participating in peer review,
knowing that antitrust liability may result if they render a decision denying
privileges."M Mediation is probably not necessary to resolve the physicians'
concerns, since compliance with the HCQIA will now relieve peer review
participants of antitrust liability as long as the decision was reasonable, and
the proper HCQIA procedures were followed." The importance of a final
decision is also more prevalent in antitrust cases arising from denial of
privileges than it is in cases brought on the basis of potential termination
of privileges.'" This is partly due to the fact that although the doctor is
not already in the hospital environment, he will need a final decision in
order to apply for other hospital privileges without the fear of bias or
prejudice.
Admittedly, there are still arguments for allowing adjudication of certain
staff privilege disputes. The need for precedent is persuasive, especially in
the context of complex cases with vague laws. 67 On the other hand, it has
been argued that precedent does not necessarily resolve the underlying
hostilities involved in many disputes," and mediation may be a better
method for dealing with individual problems because mediators are not
required to apply substantive law.' 69 As mediators become better educated
in the complex issues involved in privilege disputes, the need for precedent
will likely decline.
V. CONCLUSION

Due to the increasing number of hospital staff privilege disputes, there
is a need not only to reduce the amount of litigation, but also the need to
mend physician-employer relationships. The lower the tension in the
163. Id. at 826-27.
164. Note, Physician Staff Privilege Cases: Antitrust Liability and the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 609, 624 (1988).
165. 42 U.S.C. *11111 (1986).
166. Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital, 526 A.2d 697, 702 (NJ. 1987).
167. Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL L. REv. 1,
20 (1987).
168. Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goal of Civil Justice: Jurisdictional
Principlesfor Process Choice, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 893, 915.
169. J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 89, at 26.
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hospital, the more likely it is that patients will perceive physicians in a
more positive light." 0 Although the HCQIA will likely result in a reduction
of lawsuits, mediation may be essential to reducing the hostility that often
exists after a physician's conduct is questioned. There are many ways to
resolve disputes, but perhaps one commentator's analogy between law and
medicine best explains the need for mediation:
According to this analogy, a dispute is a wound or disease in the
social fabric or body politic parallel to a physical wound or disease
in the physical body. A judge (or lawyer, or other type of dispute
handler) performs the task of healing the rupture in the social
fabric, just as the doctor performs that of healing the physical
illness.... Where treatment is wisely and appropriately applied,
a dispute presents the opportunity for improvement, not disruption
of societal help and not destruction. As such, disputes are moments
of opportunity ....

Where treatment is haphazard, arbitrary, ill-

founded, the opportunity is lost. Indeed, in such a situation, the
constructive potential
of the dispute may degenerate into a
171
destructive result.
As doctors have potential alternatives for treating patients, lawyers should
also have choices for resolving disputes. With states needing to opt-in or
out of the act by October 14, 1989,172 and more regulations still due to be
released, attorneys must begin to deal with privilege issues. Perhaps
disputes regarding the termination of hospital staff privileges are situations
in which mediation is the best prescription.
LAUREL E. SHEALY

170. Press, The Predisposition to File Claims: The Patient'sPerspective, 12 LAw, MED., &
(April 1984). Injury by itself, ... , does not translate into the intense
hostility that a lawsuit expresses. The objective sign must be joined with the subjective state
Without anger, an act as hostile as a lawsuit, particularly against as wellof being angry ....
established authority as a physician, is impossible to contemplate. In short, the incident - the
mechanical event itself - is insufficient to explain claims, and thus can only be a partial element
in their prevention.
It
171. Id. at 1032-33.
172. 42 U.S.C. §11111(c)(i) (1986).
HEALTH CARE 53
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